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Stakeholder Influences on the Design of Firms’ Environmental Practices 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental practices (EPs) are the activities that assist firms in managing their 
environmental issues (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996), and complying with and moving beyond a 
reactionary strategic posture about environmental concerns (Aragón-Correa & Rubio-López, 
2007). Depending on their degree of implementation (Darnall et al., 2010a; Darnall & Kim, 
2012; Khanna & Anton, 2002), these practices can reduc  firms’ impact to the natural 
environment because they provide a structure for managers to systematically assess (and 
improve) their environmental performance (Khanna & Anton, 2002; King et al., 2005). Since the 
mid-1990s, firms worldwide have increased their use of EPs. While there are many types of EPs 
(i.e., recycling programs, green supply-chain management practices, life-cycle assessment, or 
environmental monitoring), the general theoretical argument is the same—that stakeholders 
influence their adoption (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Murillo-Luna 
et al., 2008), regardless of their form (Darnall et al., 2010a).  
While prior literature assessing stakeholder influences on firms’ EP adoption has typically 
regarded EP adoption monolithically – either organiz tions adopt them or not (e.g., Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008; Sharma & 
Henriques, 2005), we suggest that differences in stakeholder influences also relate to EP design. 
For instance, stakeholders influence managers to make strategic decisions about whether to 
restrict their EPs to a limited number of environmetal impacts or a more comprehensive range 
of environmental impacts (Darnall & Kim, 2012). Additionally, varying degrees of stakeholder 
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influences may relate to whether or not managers design their EPs so that they are visible to 
external stakeholders (by way of certification or the release of public environmental reports) 
(Bowen, 2000). Variations in EP design may subsequently affect how EPs may improve the 
natural environment (Hawn & Ioannou, 2016; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Sharma & Henriques, 
2005), and thus enhance strategic business value (Darnall et al., 2010a; Ferrón-Vilchez & 
Darnall, 2016; Hawn & Ioannou, 2016). However, as yet, management literature has not 
developed a framework that considers how stakeholders ar  related to the design of firms’ EPs.  
We examine these issues by utilizing multinomial regression techniques for a sample of 
1,761 manufacturing firms operating in seven countries. Our findings offer two important 
contributions to theory and practice. First, our results extend stakeholder theory and previous 
analyses of how stakeholders influence firms’ decision to adopt different environmental practices 
(e.g. Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008; 
Sharma & Henriques, 2005). We offer robust empirical evidence that stakeholders’ influence 
extends beyond the dichotomous EP adoption decision, and related also to the design of the EPs 
they adopt. We show that influences from different types (and combinations) of stakeholders are 
related strongly to variations in firms’ EP design, a d especially EP comprehensiveness and 
visibility. Second, we respond to recent calls for more nuanced applications of stakeholder 
theory when analyzing the firm strategy (e.g., Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Devinney, 2013). To 
do so, we develop a novel classification framework that characterizes the ways in which 
stakeholders influence firms’ strategic decisions about EP design. We describe how variations in 
EP comprehensiveness and visibility lead to four types of strategic approaches—movers and 
shakers, backroom operators, wannabes, and passivists. The framework also informs recent 
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discussions (e.g. Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Lyon & Montgomery, 
2015) about corporate “greenwashing” and symbolic behavior by identifying which firms are 
more likely to engage in these sorts of activities. Finally, our results offer evidence to managers 
about how stakeholder influences extend beyond the EP adoption decision to the critical design 
features of their EPs. By attending to these influences, firms may increase the strategic value of 
their EPs to their organizaiton.  
2. STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND FIRMS’ EP ADOPTION 
Stakeholders are “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
an organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984:46). Stakeholder theory asks which of these groups 
of individuals deserve managers’ attention and which do not (Mitchell et al., 1997). Managers 
are the critical focal point within this discussion because their perceptions determine which 
stakeholders—internal and external— merit consideration over others (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Fineman & Clarke, 1996).  
Internal stakeholders have a direct economic stake in the organization (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995) and operate inside the firm’s physical boundaries. They include management and non-
management employees, and are critical to the succes or failure of any firm strategy (Freeman, 
1984). These stakeholders also have a vested interest in maintaining normal operations and 
avoiding shutdowns (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) that can arise from environmental accidents. 
Similarly, internal stakeholders are often concerned with how environmental concerns may affect 
their job security (Fineman & Clarke, 1996), and whether designing an EP in a particular way 
can save their company money or enhance corporate reputation.  
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By contrast, external stakeholders include a range of individuals and groups who operate 
outside the firm’s physical boundaries. They include three general groups: societal stakeholders, 
regulatory stakeholders, and value chain stakeholders. Societal stakeholders consist of public 
interest groups, such as environmental and community organizations and professional 
associations (Etzion, 2007). Managers are increasingly attending to pressures from societal 
stakeholders because of their capacity to influence broader social perceptions of the firm’s 
standing within the community (Freeman, 1984). These stakeholders rely on mass media, public 
protests or campaigns, strikes, and other calls for civic engagement to influence firms’ 
environmental strategy (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). Unlike internal stakeholders who actively 
participate in the daily operations of the firm, firms typically keep societal stakeholders at arm’s 
length (Phillips & Caldwell, 2005) and limit access to information about the firm’s internal 
routines and procedures.  
Regulatory stakeholders are another type of external stakeholder, and consist of government 
agents who are tasked with legislating or implementing environmental policies. They typically 
influence firms by way of mandating adherence to enviro mental regulations. Firms that fail to 
comply with these regulatory provisions can incur legal action, penalties, and fines (Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1996). Because their primary goal is enviro mental improvement, regulatory 
stakeholders pressure firms to design robust EPs since doing so would benefit society more 
broadly (Fiorino, 2006). 
Finally, value chain stakeholders consist of suppliers, corporate buyers, and household 
consumers (Freeman, 1984). Suppliers can communicate their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the firm’s environmental performance by ceasing deliveries of necessary materials and 
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pressuring upstream buyers to switch to more enviromentally friendly substitutes (Airike et al., 
2016; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999) in order to avoid inheriting environmental risk (Klassen & 
Whybark, 1999). Similarly, corporate buyers and household consumers can register their 
preferences by purchasing products or services that originate from environmentally conscious 
producers (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; Maniatis, 2016) and blacklisting products and services 
with poor EPs (Goh & Balaji, 2016; Maniatis, 2016). However, value chain stakeholders, like 
societal stakeholders, typically lack access to infrmation about whether or not a firm’s EP is 
designed to reduce environmental impacts unless the firm makes this information visible 
externally. 
3. DESIGN OF FIRMS’ ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES 
In characterizing the overall influence of stakeholders on firms’ EPs, previous literature has 
considered distinctions between internal versus external stakeholders and market versus non-
market stakeholders, while others assess all relevant st keholders without drawing distinctions 
among them (e.g., Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Murillo-Luna et 
al., 2008). In each of these instances, the stakehold r literature has assumed a homogeneous 
vision of stakeholder influences and their relationship with EPs in that each stakeholder group is 
typically associated with the dichotomous managerial adoption decision—to adopt or not (e.g., 
Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008). However, some scholars (e.g., Freeman 
et al., 2010) have begun to ask for a more detailed ttention to the complexity of stakeholder 
interests and the relationship of these interests with variations in firm strategy. We suggest that 
this sort of complexity extends to how stakeholder influences are related to variations in the 
design of a given EP. We focus on two design featurs: comprehensiveness and visibility. 
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3.1 EP Comprehensiveness 
A comprehensive EP is designed to address the full range of impacts that the firm’s EP has 
on the natural environment (Darnall & Kim, 2012; Khanna & Anton, 2002). By contrast, firms 
that design a less comprehensive EP limit their assessments to only one or a few environmental 
impacts, despite the fact that they could consider others (Darnall & Kim, 2012). Variations in the 
comprehensiveness of similar EPs highlight the fact the typical approach of asking firms whether 
they have adopted a particular type of EP fails to account for design comprehensiveness (Darnall 
et al., 2010a). Rather, firms strategically decide whether or not to leverage their EPs to address a 
greater range of environmental impacts. 
Take the case of environmental monitoring. Environme tal monitoring is an EP used to 
measure a firm’s environmental impacts, assess its environmental trends (Tam et al., 2006), and 
evaluate any variations over time. Environmental monitoring involves collecting standardized 
data for internal assessments and benchmarking (Jasch, 2000; Phillips & Caldwell, 2005). These 
activities provide managers with a rationale for setting and assessing environmental goals 
(National Research Council, 1990), making environmetal management changes, and identifying 
areas for improvement (Tam et al., 2006).  
Variations in comprehensiveness of environmental monitoring exist even though the overall 
objective of monitoring is to help improve environmental performance. For instance, some 
managers may choose to monitor their firm’s end-of-pipe wastewater effluents, but not monitor 
its impacts to solid waste, air pollution and global pollutants. This monitoring strategy is 
considered less comprehensive than a comparable facility that monitors its impacts to water, 
solid waste, and air emissions. Variations in monitoring comprehensiveness also exist among 
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firms that undertake environmental monitoring as part of the certification expectation of an 
environmental management system (EMS) standard (e.g., ISO 14001 and EMAS). Flexibility 
within these EMS standards allows firms to decide wh ther to track all of their environmental 
impacts or a portion of them. 
3.2 EP visibility 
Visible EPs are designed in a way that they are readily observable to stakeholders (Bowen, 
2000) who are both internal and external to the firm. Visibility usually increases as stakeholders 
are involved during EP design. Since internal stakeholders generally design a firm’s EP and take 
the lead in implementing it, an EP tends to be more visible to these stakeholders, even if 
consultants assist with EP design. Visibility can also come by way of conscious actions on the 
part of the firm to make its EPs more observable ext rnally. For instance, some firms may 
participate in voluntary environmental programs sponsored by government or independent third 
parties that promote member firms’ environmental action (Darnall et al., 2010b). By conveying 
information about their otherwise unobservable management practices, these firms signal 
information to external stakeholders that they are improving their production processes (Melnyk 
et al., 2003) and decreasing pollution emissions (Russo, 2002). Visibility also increases the 
transparency, reputation and legitimacy of a firm’s EP because it creates a mechanism for 
external stakeholders to more strongly scrutinize the firm’s EP (Delmas, 2001; Perrault & Clark, 
2016).  
By contrast, an EP that lacks visibility is not readily observable externally (Khanna & Anton, 
2002) because the firm avoids communicating information about it, even if the EP is 
comprehensive in its approach to reduce environmental harms. There are several reasons why a 
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firm may seek this strategic option, one of which relates to the firm’s preference to avoid 
unnecessary scrutiny of its EP because implementatio  may fail or the firm may worry that its 
environmental improvements may not be sufficient. Additionally, firms may seek to avoid 
expenses associated with making an EP visible. For instance, related to obtaining external 
certification, firms accrue costs due to employee training, documentation, contracting with 
environmental consultants, and audits, among other requirements (Curkovic & Sroufe, 2011).   
Related to the case of environmental monitoring, external stakeholders typically are not 
directly involved in the continual data collection a d evaluation process (King et al., 2005) 
associated with this EP. As such, environmental monitori g practices are generally less 
observable to them unless the firm undertakes actions  make them visible. One way of doing so 
is for firms to adopt environmental monitoring as part of a certified EMS, such as ISO 14001 or 
EMAS. By virtue of obtaining certification, these practices become more visible externally in 
that external stakeholders have knowledge that a firm is undertaking environmental monitoring 
that is audited by an independent third party. In other instances, firms might make their 
environmental monitoring practices visible by way of publicly reporting the outcomes of their 
monitoring assessments. 
In spite of the increased transparency that comes with EP visibility, some scholars have 
questioned whether visible EPs are associated with real improvements to the natural environment 
(e.g., Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Christmann & Taylor, 2006; King et al., 2005; Russo, 2009). 
This view is borne from concerns that some firms may be eager to “greenwash” (Bowen 2014) 
and make an EP visible to external stakeholders, thu  reducing stakeholder pressures, while 
failing to actually reduce their environmental risks (Delmas & Keller, 2005). For instance, firms 
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that adopt environmental monitoring as part of their c rtified EMS may fail to (or only modestly) 
improve their environmental performance. In other instances, firms may improve performance 
for only a limited range of environmental impacts when other improvements could be made 
(Darnall & Kim, 2012). Both situations can occur because most certified EMSs do not require 
third-party auditors to publicly release the results of their environmental audits. As such, many 
external stakeholders are limited in their ability to determine whether or not a firm’s 
environmental monitoring is indeed comprehensive (Aragón-Correa & Rubio-López, 2007). 
Rather, firm managers chose whether to make their env onmental audit information publicly 
accessible, and few actually do because the majority f companies consider knowledge about 
their environmental audits to be confidential busine s information (Backer, 2013). So while there 
is certainty that firms with a certified EMS undertake some form of routine monitoring, because 
of the institutional design of these certification standards, there is likely to be significant 
variation in the comprehensiveness of firms’ monitoring practices.   
4. STAKEHOLDERS’ PRESSURES AND THE DESIGN OF ENVIRONME NTAL 
PRACTICES  
In an effort to clarify existing literature discussing the complex relationship between 
stakeholder influences and firms’ EP design, we consider comprehensiveness and visibility 
together. We suggest that combined, these design features characterize a typology of four types 
of firm strategies—passivists, wannabes, backroom operators, and movers and shakers (see 
Figure 1). While each feature of our novel framework might be delimited along a continuum, the 
four categories offer important clarity for our theor tical arguments suggesting that variations in 
stakeholder interests influence the design of an EP.  
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--INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
Passivists are firms that focus on designing less comprehensiv  EPs. These firms do not 
make their EPs visible to external stakeholders in that they do not utilize external certification 
schemes. Wannabes are similar to passivists in that they manage a narrower array of 
environmental impacts, despite the fact that they could address others. However, what makes 
wannabes differ from passivists is that wannabes seek external visibility for their EPs, even if 
their approach is not comprehensive. Backroom operators differ from passivists and wannabes in 
that they adopt EPs that are comprehensive in their goal of reducing a broad array of 
environmental impacts. These firms al o have a greater likelihood of reducing their overall 
environmental risk (Godfrey et al., 2009). However, like passivists, backroom operators are not 
motivated to make their EPs visible. Indeed, these firms actively limit public access to internal 
data about firms’ environmental performance (Delmas, 2000; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011). Finally, 
movers and shakers are firms that adopt EPs that are comprehensive in their ability to address a 
wider range of environmental impacts and are visible to external stakeholders. 
In considering the extent to which stakeholders influence firms to select one EP structure 
over another, we use passivists as a point of comparison. In particular, firms that perceive having 
stronger influences from internal and societal stakeholders (but not other stakeholders) are more 
likely to adopt a wannabe strategy over a passivist strategy. Our rationale relates to the 
seemingly incongruent management approach of wannabes—that they make an EP visible even 
though their EP design is not comprehensive. In the presence of societal stakeholder pressures, a 
firm’s internal stakeholders may pressure firm managers to pursue the intangible positive 
reputational benefits that may come with having a heig tened environmental profile (Bowen, 
2014; Perrault & Clark, 2016). Since firms often struggle to adopt comprehensive but difficult-
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to-implement EPs (e.g., González-Benito & González-B nito, 2008; Jiang & Bansal, 2003), and 
EP adoption can be costly, firms have an incentive to satisfy pressures from societal stakeholders 
by creating the appearance of being “green.” These firms signal that they are aggressive about 
managing their environmental activities when in fact they are only moderately so (e.g., Aragón-
Correa & Rubio-López, 2007). In such situations, firms produce symbolic signals—by way of 
certification and disclosure in public environmental reports—that increase societal recognition 
for their otherwise modest EP (Arena et al., 2015; Aravind & Chirstmann, 2011; Phillips & 
Caldwell, 2005). Since firms typically keep societal st keholders at arm’s length (Phillips & 
Caldwell, 2005), these stakeholders often lack access to information about the specific risks 
associated with a firm’s various manufacturing practices (Bowen, 2014). This situation thus 
creates opportunities for firms to address these stakeholder pressures by adopting a wannabe 
strategy.  
However, because internal stakeholders typically have significant knowledge about the 
firm’s ongoing operations (Zutshi & Sohal, 2004), and access related to information about the 
organization’s environmental risk, when other stakeholder pressures are present, firms with 
significant pressures from internal stakeholders are more likely to adopt another EP structure. 
Regulatory stakeholders typically have (or could gain) ccess to information about a firm’s 
environmental risk because of their role as environme tal regulators. They also often have a 
stronger understanding of the environmental and public health risks associated with pollution 
(Wilen & Homans, 1998) and thus would likely be criti al of a firm’s wannabe strategy. For 
these reasons, firms that pursue a wannabe strategy are no more likely than passivists to feel 
influenced by regulatory pressures. 
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Hypothesis 1: Managers who perceive having greater internal and societal stakeholder 
pressures are more likely to pursue a wannabe EP adoption strategy as compared to a 
passivist EP adoption strategy. 
Like wannabes, firms that decide to undertake backroom operator strategy—by designing an 
EP that is comprehensive (but not visible)—are likely to have stronger influence from societal 
and internal stakeholders than passivists. However, these pressures are coupled with influences 
from regulatory stakeholders who typically have greater access to environmental information and 
knowledge about the risk associated with a firm’s operational activities (Kassinis & Vafeas, 
2006; Wilen & Homans, 1998). Regulatory stakeholders therefore are expected to see through a 
wannabe strategy. In response, firms with greater pressures from regulatory stakeholders are 
expected to act by reducing their environmental risks and liabilities (e.g., Kassinis & Vafeas, 
2006; Sharma & Henriques, 2005) and designing an EP that is more comprehensive. In doing so, 
backroom operators are also more likely to satisfy societal stakeholders’ concerns for greater 
environmental protection. While these firms are in a position to make their EPs visible 
externally, they choose not to, in part because there is less perceived need given that regulatory 
stakeholders have access to environmental information than do other stakeholders. While societal 
stakeholders might not have access to the same information, by virtue of reducing their 
environmental risk, backroom operators perceive that they are satisfying these stakeholders’ 
needs. In the presence of stronger pressures from societal stakeholders, these firms would likely 
need to design an EP that is more visible. 
Related to value chain stakeholders, we anticipate that firms that pursue a backroom operator 
strategy are no more likely to have greater pressures these stak holders than passivists because 
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value chain stakeholders who are concerned about environmental matters often require the firms 
they source from to obtain external certification of their environmental activities and agree to on-
site visits to verify the rigor of their environmental programs (Arimura et al., 2011). Undertaking 
a backroom operator strategy therefore would not satisfy these stakeholders’ concerns. 
Hypothesis 2: Managers who perceive having greater internal, societal, and regulatory 
stakeholder pressures are more likely to pursue a backroom operator EP adoption strategy as 
compared to a passivist EP adoption strategy. 
Environmental visibility comes at a cost, and firms tend not pursue it unless they perceive 
some strategic value (Jiang & Bansal, 2003). In arriving at the managerial decision to pursue a 
mover and shaker strategy, firms are more likely to feel pressures from a broader array of 
stakeholders than all other firms, and also endure greater overall pressures from internal, social 
and regulatory stakeholders. Like wannabes, firms that undertake a mover and shaker strategy 
are more likely to perceive pressure from societal st keholders and believe that satisfying these 
stakeholder concerns can lead to reputational benefits (Emerson et al., 2009). However, like 
backroom operators, these firms are also more likely to be influenced by regulatory stakeholders 
who place value on the comprehensiveness of a firm’s EP and have greater access to 
environmental risk information. What differentiates movers and shakers from backroom 
operators is that they are also more likely to feel pressure from value chain stakeholders.  
Firms that perceive having greater pressures from value chain stakeholders are concerned 
about consumers and corporate buyers increasingly re istering their environmental preferences 
by purchasing products that originate from “green” firms (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; 
Maniatis, 2016). These pressures also originate from c ncerns about inheriting environmental 
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risks that arise from contractual relationships with suppliers (Phillips & Caldwell, 2005). These 
buyers recognize that visible practices are not necessarily comprehensive, and therefore require 
firms that they do business with to agree to on-site audits to verify the rigor of their 
environmental programs and require that their suppliers design an EP that is comprehensive 
(Arimura et al., 2011). Additionally, corporate buyers are increasingly requiring firms that they 
do business with to obtain external certification of their environmental activities (Arimura et al. 
2011). As a consequence, firms that perceive having greater pressures from value chain 
stakeholders are more likely to adopt a mover and shaker strategy over any other sort of EP 
adoption strategy. 
Hypothesis 3: Managers who perceive having greater internal, societal, regulatory, and value 
chain stakeholder pressures are more likely to pursue a mover and shaker EP adoption 
strategy as compared to a p ssivist EP adoption strategy.  
Hypothesis 4: Managers who pursue a mover and shaker EP adoption strategy perceive 
having greater stakeholder pressures than those experi nced by backroom operators. 
5. RESEARCH METHODS 
5.1 Data 
The data for this study were obtained from a survey developed by the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Environment Directorate in collaboration 
with academic researchers. The survey was sent in 2003 to publicly and privately owned firms 
and facilities (each of which had at least 50 employees) from manufacturing industries in 
Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, and the United States. A total of 4,195 
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organizations responded to the survey, leading to a response rate of 24.7%, which is similar to 
prior studies about firms’ EPs (e.g., Delmas & Keller, 2005; Melnyk et al., 2003). 
Since our research was pertinent to stakeholder influe ces on firm-level decisions, we only 
included responses that related to firm-level EP design decisions. We made this distinction by 
drawing on data from one OECD question that asked managers, “How many different production 
facilities does your firm have?” We included only those cases in which managers answered “1 
facility” to this question. After accounting for this issue, our final sample was 1,761 firms, which 
is well above the 575 responses needed to estimate proportions with a 99% confidence interval. 
Common method bias (CMB) relates to respondents’ affective states and the tendency to 
respond in a socially desirable way (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Two kinds of remedies exist for 
CMB: procedural remedies, which occur during research design, and statistical remedies, which 
occur after data collection (Chang et al., 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Related to the procedural 
remedies, the OECD incorporated several survey techniques to control for CMB, such as 
psychological and methodological separation of measurement (Podsakoff et al., 2003), and the 
use of six cover stories that explained the focus of each specific part of the survey in an effort to 
physically separate variables of interest. It also u ed varied question response formats (e.g., 
yes/no questions, Likert scales, open-ended questions, and semantic differential scales) to engage 
respondents to a greater degree (Chang et al., 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003) and avoided item 
ambiguity by pre-testing the survey in France, Canad , nd Japan before it was translated into 
each country’s official language and re-translated to validate the accuracy of the original 
translation. As a final procedural remedy, the survey protected respondent anonymity in order to 
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reduce respondents’ apprehension about the social ac eptability of their responses, thus 
increasing confidence in the quality of the data (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Related to statistical remedies that assess CMB, we examined the OECD data using 
Harman’s single factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). This procedure involves a factor analysis of 
all the data, and if a single factor emerges accounting for the majority of the covariation between 
the dependent and independent variables then CMB is a concern (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The 
results of our factor analysis led to 14 factors, of which the first unrotated factor accounted for only 
14.93% of the total explained variance, suggesting that CMB was less of a concern. However, as an 
additional precaution, we also relied on a partial correlation procedure (Podsakoff et al., 2003). This 
procedure controls for CMB by partialling its effects out of the predictor and criterion variables 
via the inclusion of a marker variable (Lindell & Whitney, 2001). By partialling out the average 
correlation between the marker variable and the othr variables included in the study, we can 
control for the possible contaminating effect of CMB (Podsakoff et al., 2003). We included 
facility age as our marker variable. Correlations between the marker variable and other variables 
had an average correlation of .048, and considered “small” by accepted standards (e.g., Cohen, 
1988). Using multinomial logistic regression, we thn compared the goodness of fit of our 
preferred model (McFadden R2 = 0.45) to one that incorporated our marker variable (McFadden 
R2 = 0.46). These values did not differ statistically, which further increases our confidence that 
the CMB is less of a concern.  
The OECD examined non-response bias by evaluating the eneral distribution of its survey 
respondents. The OECD assessed industry representation and firm size of the survey respondents 
relative to the distribution of firms in the broader population, and found no statistically 
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significant differences for Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, and Norway (Johnstone et 
al., 2007). The United States was an exception in that the data show that respondents within a 
couple of U.S. industries were slightly over- or under-represented (Darnall et al., 2010b). Using 
U.S. Census data, we weighted the U.S. portion of the sample to reflect industry representation. 
5.2 Dependent variable 
Related to comprehensiveness, we elected to focus on environmental monitoring, which is an 
EP premised on the idea that organizations manage what they measure. Environmental 
monitoring became popularized in the early 1980s with the development of quality management 
principles. Deming’s (1986) continuous improvement model advocated the “plan, do, check, act” 
approach towards developing high quality goods, products, services, or information. 
Environmental monitoring serves as an important foundation towards firms’ exceeding 
regulatory expectations because, in order to proactively manage their environmental impacts, 
firms must first monitor their environmental activies. Consequently, monitoring is widely 
recognized as an important EP that helps prevent and reduce a firm’s the negative environmental 
impacts.  
Related to visibility, firms have the option of making their EPs particularly visible by way of 
certification, as well as by the disclosure of public environmental reports. Certification conveys 
information to external stakeholders about a firm’s latent EPs. Nevertheless, several studies (e.g., 
Arena et al., 2015; Aravind & Christmann, 2011; King et al., 2005) have argued that some firms 
commonly use environmental certification and environmental reporting to satisfy stakeholders’ 
demands even if these firms fail to design their EPs comprehensively.  
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We formed the dependent variable using the four categories that comprise our classification 
of firms’ EPs: passivists, wannabes, backroom operators, and movers and shakers. To create this 
categorical variable, we first assessed the comprehensiveness of each firm’s environmental 
monitoring. We drew on data from one OECD question that asked managers, “Which of the 
following environmental performance measures does yur firm regularly monitor?” Firm 
managers were asked about the routine monitoring of (1) the use of natural resources (energy, 
water, etc.), (2) solid waste generation, (3) wastewa r effluent, (4) local or regional air pollution, 
and (5) global pollutants. Respondents reported “yes” or “no” to each item. By summing these 
responses, the maximum number of environmental impacts that firms within our sample could 
monitor was 5. The mean reported monitoring for firms within our sample was 2.80. We thus 
coded firms that reported monitoring between 3 to 5environmental impacts as “1” to denote that 
they had designed their environmental monitoring comprehensively, else firms were coded “0”.  
To account for visibility, we drew on two questions i  the OECD survey. The first asked 
whether the firm had acquired either ISO 14001 or EMAS certification. Respondents that 
reported “yes” were coded “1”, else “0”. We also drew on a question in the OECD survey that 
asked whether firms had developed an environmental report that was released publicly. 
Respondents that reported “yes” were coded “1”, else “0”. We summed these responses, so the 
maximum visibility value of firms within our sample was 2. Firms that reported affirmatively for 
both actions were coded “1” to denote that they had adopted an EP with more visibility, else 
firms were coded “0”.  
By considering the comprehensiveness and visibility of firm’s environmental monitoring 
together, we coded passivists as firms that lacked significant comprehensiveness and visibility 
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for their EP (0,0). Wannabes were coded to be firms that did not design a comprehensive 
environmental approach, but established visibility for their practices (0,1). Backroom operators 
were firms that designed a comprehensive but less visible approach (1,0), and movers and 
shakers were represented as firms that designed a comprehensive and visible approach (1,1)1.  
To examine the sensitivity of our coding, we also coded our monitoring variable such that 
facilities that reported monitoring 4 or 5 environmental impacts were coded as “1”, else “0”. This 
second approach offers a stricter interpretation of facilities that have designed a comprehensive 
environmental monitoring program. The recoding also necessarily changes the number of firms 
that are categorized as being wannabes, backroom operators, and movers and shakers. Table 1 
shows the sample size and descriptive statistics for each category of our dependent variable. 
--INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
5.3 Explanatory variables 
We measured managers’ perceived stakeholder influences by relying on the OECD survey 
question that asked, “How important do you consider th  influence of specific stakeholder 
groups on the EPs of your firm?” Firm managers repot d on the perceived influence of the 
following stakeholder groups: household consumers, commercial buyers, suppliers, management 
employees, non-management employees, corporate headquarters, environmental groups, 
community organizations, labor unions, and industry or trade associations. Using a three-point 
Likert scale, respondents indicated whether these influences were “not important,” “moderately 
important,” or “very important”.  
                                                 
1 We explored empirically the independence of our measures of comprehensiveness and visibility by running a Chi-
Square test of independence and a Spearman correlati n. The significance value of both measures was les  than 0.1, 
indicating a statistically significant association. However, the correlation was 0.227, thus failing to cross the 
threshold of a medium size effect, and indicating that it is substantively less relevant (Cohen, 1988). The authors 
thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we explore this potential concern.  
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Responses to this question were entered into princial omponent analysis using varimax 
rotation with Kaiser normalization. Three distinct factors emerged representing internal 
stakeholders (headquarters, management employees, and non-management employees), societal 
stakeholders (environmental groups, community organizations, labor unions, and industry or 
trade associations), and value chain stakeholders (household consumers, commercial buyers, and 
suppliers), as shown in Table 2. Cronbach’s alphas were above Nunnally’s (1978) recommended 
value of 0.70 for each factor. Following the thresholds established by Hair et al. (2009), our 
indicators appeared reliable, with standardized factor loadings above 0.5 (p<.05). 
--INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE--  
Since our stakeholder measures are formative, we utilized three procedures suggested by 
Cenfetelli and Bassellier (2009) to assess their validity. First, we ruled out the presence of 
multicollinearity among our formative indicators byassessing their variance inflation factors 
(VIF). Acceptable VIF values range from 3.33 (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006) to 10.00 (Hair 
et al., 1998), with lower values being better. In our case, the highest VIF was 2.16, suggesting 
that multicollinearity was not a concern (see Table 2). We also considered the partialized (i.e., 
relative contribution) indicator weights as well as the zero-order (i.e., absolute contribution) 
bivariate loadings between the indicators and their associated formatively measured constructs 
(Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009). The results of our assessments indicate that all weights and 
loadings were in the expected direction (positive), of reasonable size, and statistically significant 
(p < .001). Combined, these findings offer some confidence about the robustness of our 
constructs.   
To measure the influence of regulatory stakeholders, we relied on OECD survey data that 
asked firm managers, “How many times has your firm been inspected by public environmental 
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authorities (central, state/province, and municipal governments) in the last three years?” While 
this measure is not completely objective, it is subject to managers’ perceptions of inspection 
frequency (Darnall et al., 2010a), and this perception is likely to influence the implementation of 
one type of firm strategy over another.  
5.4 Control variables 
Since the OECD data were for a diverse set of organizations operating within multiple 
manufacturing sectors and countries, it was important to control for potential heterogeneities. We 
controlled for export orientation since the more export oriented the organization, the higher the 
benefits it may accrue from its more visible actions to protect the environment (Martín-Tapia et 
al., 2010). It was addressed by relying on an OECD item that asked managers, “What best 
characterizes the scope of your firm’s market?” Respondent could answer “local” (1), “national” 
(2), and “regional” or “global” (3). The reference ategory was “local”. 
Organizations operating in a competitive market are more likely to adopt EPs in order to be 
recognized as being environment-friendly. We relied on an OECD survey question that asked 
managers, “With how many other firms did your firm compete on the market for its most 
commercially important product within the past three years?” Respondents answered “less than 
5” (1), “among 5 and 10” (2), and “greater than 10” (3). The reference category was “less than 
5”. 
Related to firm size, we controlled for the number of employees within each firm. Dummy 
variables were included to address industry effects (the non-metallic minerals and metals 
industry was the reference category) and country effects (the U.S. was the reference category). 
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics and correlations for each of our variables. 
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--INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE--  
5.5 Empirical approach 
To empirically examine our research hypotheses, we reli d on multinomial logistic 
regression analysis. This technique is especially suitable for our purposes given our 4-category 
dependent variable. Multinomial logistic regression examines jointly all categories of the 
dependent variable, and uses one of the categories as reference to allow for comparisons among 
other categories of the dependent variable (Hair et al., 1998). Passivists were our reference 
category. Reported coefficients therefore represent the estimated differences between this 
category and the other dependent variable categories. W  report exponential betas for each of our 
estimations for easier interpretability of our result . The interpretation of the multinomial logit is 
that for a one-unit change in their perceived stakeholder pressure, firms are more (or less) likely 
to pursue a wannabe (or backroom operator or mover and shaker) strategy in comparison to 
passivists, holding constant other variables in the model. 
RESULTS 
The results of our multinomial logistic regression analysis are summarized in Table 4. Our 
findings show that the regression model was statistically significant at p<.001, as noted by the 
log likelihood statistic (870.49). Additionally, the McFadden R-squared statistic was 0.45, 
suggesting that the model had a good fit and was con istent with previous studies using applied 
multinomial logistic regression in the context of firms’ EPs (e.g., González-Benito & González-
Benito, 2008).  
--INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE--  
Our results indicate that societal stakeholder pressures were associated with firms that pursued 
a wannabe strategy over a passivist strategy. Firm managers that reported having high perceived 
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pressures from societal stakeholders were 824% (9.24 - 1.00, p<.05) more likely to pursue a 
wannabe strategy over a passivist strategy. However, pressures from internal stakehold rs did 
not differ statistically from passivists. These findings offer partial support to Hypothesis 1, which 
states: managers who perceive having greater internal and societal stakeholder pressures are 
more likely to pursue a wannabe EP adoption strategy as compared to a passivist EP adoption 
strategy.  
Firms that had greater pressures from internal stakeholders were 64% (1.64 - 1.00, p<.01) 
more likely to pursue a backroom operator strategy over a passivist strategy. Additionally, firms 
that reported having greater perceived influences from societal stakeholders were 36% (1.36 - 
1.00, p<.05) more likely to pursue a backroom operator strategy over a passivist strategy. 
Backroom operators were 10% (1.10 – 1.00, p<.05) more likely than passivists to perceive 
having greater pressures from regulatory stakeholders, and no more likely than passivists to have 
stronger perceived pressures from value chain stakehold rs. Taken together, these findings offer 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 2, which states that: managers who perceive having greater 
internal, societal, and regulatory stakeholder pressures are more likely to pursue a backroom 
operator EP adoption strategy as compared to a passivist EP adoption strategy. 
In examining how movers and shakers differ from passivists, as expected, firms that reported 
having greater perceived influences from internal, societal, regulatory, and value chain 
stakeholders had a greater probability of pursuing a mover and shaker strategy. More 
specifically, firms that had greater pressures from internal stakeholders were 205% (3.05 - 1.00, 
p<.01) more likely to pursue a mover and shaker strategy over a passivist strategy. Similarly, 
firms reporting having greater perceived influences from societal stakeholders were 49% (1.49 - 
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1.00, p<.05) more likely to pursue a mover and shaker strategy over a passivist strategy. Movers 
and shakers were also 7% (1.07 - 1.00, p<.05) more likely than passivists to perceive having 
greater pressures from regulatory stakeholders. Finally, compared to passivists, firms that 
perceived having greater influences from value chain stakeholders were 35% (1.35 - 1.00, p<.10) 
more likely to adopt a mover and shaker EP strategy, as compared to passivists. These findings 
offer evidence in support of Hypothesis 3: managers who perceive having greater internal, 
societal, regulatory, and value chain stakeholder pr ssures are more likely to pursue a mover and 
shaker EP adoption strategy as compared to a passivist EP adoption strategy.  
For our last comparison, we examined differences between movers and shakers and backroom 
operators, compared to passivists. Overall, we found that pressures from internal, societal, and 
value chain stakeholders were greater for m vers and shakers. The influence of internal 
stakeholders was 205% (3.05 - 1.00) greater for mover and shakers than passivists, whereas 
pressures for internal stakeholders were 64% (1.64 – 1.00) greater for backroom operators than 
passivists. Compared to passivists, influence of internal stakeholders therefore was 141% (205% 
- 64%) greater for movers and shakers than backroom operators. Similarly, the influence of 
societal stakeholders was 49% (1.49 – 1.00, p<.05) greater for mover and shakers than passivists, 
whereas societal stakeholders were 36% (1.36 – 1.00, p<. 5) greater for backroom operators 
than passivists. Compared to passivists, influence of internal stakeholders therefore was 13% 
(49% - 36%) greater for movers and shakers’ than backroom operators. While there was little 
practical difference (-3%) between the influence of regulatory stakeholders for mover and 
shakers as compared to backroom operators (1.07 - 1.10), value chain stakeholders had a 20% 
greater influence for movers and shakers than backroom operators (1.35 - 1.15). Combined, 
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these findings offer evidence in support of Hypothesis 4, which states that: managers who pursue 
a mover and shaker EP adoption strategy perceive having greater stakehold r pressures than 
those experienced by backroom operators. 
The results of our stricter model (also shown in Table 4) indicate that across the three EP 
adoption categories—wannabes, backroom operators, and movers and shakers—and four 
stakeholder categories, 10 of our 12 estimates remained consistent in terms of sign and statistical 
significance. These findings offer additional support f r the strength of our relationships of 
interest.  
6. DISCUSSION  
Our results offer robust evidence that variations in takeholder pressures are related to 
differences in managerial decisions about the design of their EPs, especially as they relate to 
variations in comprehensiveness and visibility. These variations, we suggest, characterize four 
types of EP strategies: movers and shakers, backroom operators, wannabes, and passivists.  
Compared to passivists, we show that greater pressures from societal stakeholders are 
associated all other EP adoption strategies. In instances where managers endure significant 
pressures from societal stakeholders (and no other s akeholders), firms are more likely to pursue 
a wannabe strategy that lacks comprehensiveness, but is visible externally. Compared to more 
comprehensive EPs (Darnall & Kim, 2012; Darnall et al., 2010a), this strategic approach is less 
likely to reduce environmental risks (Bowen, 2014; Delmas & Keller, 2005) because it is largely 
symbolic (Aravind & Christmann, 2011; King et al., 2005). Firms most likely pursue this 
strategy seek to legitimize their EPs by obtaining support from their social environment without 
committing to real environmental improvements (Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Christmann & 
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Taylor, 2006). In this case, wannabes are attempting to appeal to societal stakeholders, who 
typically lack access to information about the risks associated with a firm’s various 
manufacturing practices (Bowen, 2014). By selectively disclosing positive information about 
their environmental activities, these firms create an overly positive corporate image (Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2011), and the appearance of greenwashing (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014; Ramus 
& Montiel, 2005).  
By contrast, managers’ perceived pressures from internal, societal, and regulatory 
stakeholders appear to influence them to design an EP that is comprehensive, as is the case for 
backroom operators and movers and shakers. We suggest that this is because internal 
stakeholders generally have significant knowledge about the firm’s ongoing operations (Zutshi & 
Sohal, 2004), and how to mitigate its environmental risk. Similarly, regulatory stakeholders have 
(or could gain) access to information about a firm’s environmental risk that would otherwise 
expose a wannabe strategy. In the presence of these stakeholder pressu s, firms are more likely 
to design EPs that are more comprehensive and have greater potential to reduce environmental 
harms.   
Compared to backroom operators, movers and shakers have greater overall stakeholder 
pressures from internal, societal and value chain st keholders. In responding to these pressures, 
movers and shakers appear to design EPs that are more comprehensive, thus improving 
managers’ internal information (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011), but also increases opportunities for 
improving environmental performance. By virtue of making their environmental information 
available to external stakeholders, these firms are addressing their greater pressures from 
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external stakeholders, with the promise of obtaining broader external credibility (Emerson et al., 
2009). 
7. CONCLUSION 
This study addresses the concern that while prior literature has emphasized that stakeholders 
influence a firm’s decision to adopt EPs, little is known about how stakeholders influence the 
design features of firms’ EPs. We offer two important theoretical contributions to the previous 
literature on stakeholders as it relates to firms’ anagement strategies.  
First, the results of our research present strong evidence that stakeholders’ influence, and 
combinations of pressures from different stakeholder groups, extends well beyond EP adoption 
decisions to decisions about EP design, and specifically their comprehensiveness and visibility 
As such, the scope of stakeholders’ influence during EP adoption appears more far reaching than 
previously considered in that stakeholders are related strongly to choices about the design 
features of EPs, and especially their comprehensiveess and visibility. An understanding of these 
critical distinctions would have gone unnoticed if we were to have focused simply on how 
stakeholders relate to firms’ decision of whether or n t to adopt an EP.  
Second, this research offers a much needed extension to existing stakeholder literature 
assessing the relationship between stakeholders’ influence and the EP adoption decision (e.g. 
Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008; Sharma 
& Henriques, 2005). It develops a novel classification framework that is the first articulation of 
the ways in which stakeholders influence firms’ EP design. We describe how variations in the 
design features of EPs (and especially their comprehensiveness and visibility) lead to four types 
of strategic approaches—movers and shakers, backroom operators, wannabes, and passivists. 
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This framework responds to a growing concern that more nuanced studies are needed that 
examine the connection between stakeholder theory and firm strategy (e.g., Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst, 2014; Devinney, 2013). Our research offers important insight about the complex 
relationship between firms’ stakeholders and their environmental strategy. It also contributes to 
ongoing discussions about corporate greenwashing (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014; Lyon & 
Maxwell, 2011; Lyon & Montgomery, 2015; Ramus & Montiel, 2005) and symbolic behavior 
(Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Christmann & Taylor, 2006). Our findings suggest that firms may 
be most prone to these deceptive behaviors when they perceive having greater pressure from 
societal stakeholders (who typically lack access to inf rmation about a firm’s environmental 
risks (Bowen, 2014)), and no perceived pressure from internal, regulatory or value chain 
stakeholders. These findings offer critical evidence about the nuanced relationship between 
firms’ strategic responses and different types of stakeholder interests. 
7.1 Managerial Implications 
While researchers (e.g., Murillo-Luna et al., 2008; Sharma & Henriques, 2005) suggest that 
managers should embrace the principle that stakehold rs prefer that companies adopt 
environmentally friendly business practices, translting this principle into an actionable EP often 
poses significant challenge (Jiang & Bansal, 2003; Ramus & Montiel, 2005). In general terms, 
our results highlight that managers might make an explicit or implicit decision regarding the 
stakeholders’ environmental priorities that they want to satisfy. Our research suggests that 
managers who perceive strong pressure from all stakeholders might be persuaded do so by 
developing a mover and shaker strategy. If these managers skimp on either design features—
comprehensiveness or visibility—they may not be able to satisfy their stakeholders’ concerns, 
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which could affect their firms’ overall external legitimacy. As such, they develop EPs that are 
more robust in their monitoring approach and offer a mechanism for stakeholders to determine 
whether or not these EPs exist. 
By contrast, managers who seek to satisfy only societal stakeholders appear more inclined to 
adopt a wannabe strategy. However, this strategic approach is quite risky. Since environmental 
monitoring is critical towards obtaining environmental improvements (Darnall & Kim, 2012), 
wannabes may be less likely to improve the natural environme t. If so, these managers run the 
risk of their firms could be labeled greenwashers (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Lyon & Montgomery, 
2015; Ramus & Montiel, 2005) if they cannot back up their environmental positions with 
credible information about their improved environmental performance.  
Additionally, for managers who are considering implementing an EP, our results offer 
evidence that stakeholder influences tend to extend b yond the adoption decision and are often 
related to the critical design features of these EPs. Paying attention to these influences may help 
firms address their stakeholder preferences more appropriately, while increasing strategic value 
to their organization.   
7.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Our research is bounded by our sample, which includes cross-sectional data for facilities with 
50 or more employees that completed the OECD survey, and so the results of our study do not 
extend to time-variant relationships or smaller firms. Future research would benefit from 
examining how stakeholder influences are associated with the design features of firms’ EPs over 
time and smaller firms. Doing so would discern whether stakeholder pressures are related 
similarly to the visibility and comprehensiveness of their EPs. While cross-sectional studies of 
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this sort are data intensive, our hope is that the results of this study offer justification for 
undertaking them.  
Further, prospective research could extend this study by examining how other stakeholders, 
such as potential employees, media, etc., might rela e to the design of firms’ EPs. For instance, 
potential employees may be particularly salient as there is an increasing trend for recent 
graduates to assess their potential employers' environmental reputation when choosing a job. 
Similarly, prior media coverage often shapes firms’ environmental strategy (Govindan et al., 
2014) or even the influence of sub-suppliers (Grimm et al., 2016). While data limitations 
prevented us from considering these issues, they may be relevant factors to consider moving 
forward.  
Moreover, even though the OECD dataset consists of an international sample, our study is 
limited in its ability to determine whether stakeholder influences on firms’ EPs are associated 
with cultural differences among countries and over time. For instance, Matten and Moon (2008) 
suggest that international firms are shifting their CSR practices such that they are more explicit 
and less implicit. What remains uncertain is whether shifts towards more explicit EPs adoption is 
more closely aligned with wannabes approach or a mover and shaker approach. Drawing on the 
results of this study, we might expect that variations in stakeholder pressures may relate to firms 
pursing more explicit EP adoption. However, future research would benefit from analyzing these 
relationships further using cross-country and cultura  perception data. 
Another important issue to consider is that some EPs may be more visible for different types 
of stakeholders. For instance, ISO 14001 certificaton may be more visible and relevant to value 
chain stakeholders than public environmental reports, whereas public reports may be more 
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relevant to regulatory stakeholders than ISO 14001 certification. Examining these sorts of 
questions would offer interesting perspective on the link between stakeholder pressures and the 
design features of firms’ EPs. Similarly, one factor that may potentially shift wannabes towards 
becoming mover and shakers is that in 2015 the ISO 14001 standard was revised in a way that 
places more emphasis on improving environmental performance (ISO, 2015). The revised 
standard also encourages firms to consider stakehold rs concerns during in the implementation 
of the standard (ISO, 2015). It remains to be seen whether these revisions encourage wannabes 
to undertake a more comprehensive approach to reducing their environmental risks, thus 
reducing concerns about their potential greenwashing. However, future research should consider 
this issue. 
Finally, this study examines how different stakeholder influences are related to firms’ 
selection of a passivist EP adoption strategy over a w nnabe, backroom operator, or mover and 
shaker strategy. What would be interesting to know is how firms’ selections of these strategies 
might lead to variations in product development andpricing, in addition to differences in firms’ 
cost levels, competitive market position, or even why managers elect to decertify their EPs 
(Heras et al., 2016). Since firms that design more r bust EPs are likely to enhance their strategic 
advantage by way of increased operational efficiencies (e.g., González-Benito & González-
Benito, 2008; Darnall et al., 2010a) and innovative practices, it is possible that firms that pursue 
either a backroom operator or a mover and shaker strategy may accrue greater financial 
advantages than passivists and wannabes. However, future research should consider these issues 
more formally, and this study offers a theoretical fr mework for doing so. 
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Passivists 661 37.54% 1.24 (.81) 0/2 .13 (.33) 0/1 
Wannabes  13 0.74% 2 (0) 0/2 2 (0) 2 
Backroom Operators 908 51.56% 3.69 (.76) 3/5 .36 (.48) 0/1 
Movers and Shakers 179 10.16% 4.07 (.76) 3/5 2 (0) 2 
Total 1,761 100.00% 2.80 (1.44) 0/5 .46 (.71) 0/2 
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Table 2. Factor analysis, VIFs, weights and loadings of perceived stakeholder influences 




















Corporate headquarters .71 .05 .24 1.25 .32***    .65***    
Management employees .84 .30 .13 2.16 .44***    .90***    
Non-management employees .79 .36 .15 2.09 .45***    .89***    
   
 
      
Environmental groups .15 .76 .24 1.71  .32***    .78***   
Neighborhood/community groups .20 .64 .33 1.48  .38***    .76***   
Labor unions .25 .78 .05 1.62  .35***    .74***   
Industry/trade associations .17 .77 .19 1.72  .28***    .75***   
   
 
      
Household consumers .04 .23 .77 1.45   .29***    .68***  
Commercial buyers .18 .10 .82 1.65   .43***    .81***  
Suppliers of good/services .22 .25 .66 1.43   .54***    .84***  
a Loadings stronger than ± 0.50 are bolded. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization;  b Variance Inflation Factor; 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Internal stakeholders 1                    
2 Societal stakeholders .000 1                   
3 Value chain stakeholders .000 .000 1                  
4 Regulatory stakeholders .163**  .133**  .072 1                 
5 Market Scope .136**  .010 -.034 .094**  1                
6 Competitors -.051 -.099* .126**  .034 .003 1               
7 Size .161**  .160**  .165**  .228**  .180**  -.009 1              
8 Food, beverage, textiles -.082* .011 .025 .018 -.148**  .089**  -.039 1             
9 Pulp, paper, print -.032 .033 -.032 -.025 -.052* .063**  -.030 -.111**  1            
10 Petroleum, chem., rubber.002 -.030 -.043 .012 -.137**  .074**  -.001 -.141**  -.078**  1           
11 Non metallic and metals -.014 .014 .029 .075**  .041 -.046 -.013 -.207**  -.115**  -.146**  1          
12 Machinery, media equip. .094* .001 -.006 .016 .010 -.017 -.033 -.240**  -.133**  -.169**  -.248**  1         
13 Transportation equip. .009 -.030 .008 -.088**  .191**  -.098**  .090**  -.282**  -.156**  -.198**  -.291**  -.338**  1        
14 USA .034 .163**  .027 .144**  .029 -.013 .036 -.042 -.004 -.057* .040 .088**  -.064**  1       
15 Germany .114**  -.259**  -.035 .121**  .251**  .173**  -.011 -.033 -.036 .041 -.015 .033 .005 -.136**  1      
16 Hungary .001 .044 .173**  .028 .132**  -.041 .103**  .068**  .032 -.034 .012 -.081**  .016 -.079**  -.242**  1     
17 Japan -.236**  -.002 .118**  -.123**  -.388**  -.037 -.059* .005 -.108**  -.001 -.029 -.007 .087**  -.160**  -.488**  -.285**  1    
18 Norway -.016 .080* -.157**  -.069**  .033 -.071**  -.052* -.010 .099**  .003 -.028 -.002 -.018 -.057* -.172**  -.101**  -.203**  1   
19 France .120**  .103**  -.125**  -.068**  .043 -.094**  .021 .030 .007 .026 .042 -.002 -.078**  -.054* -.165**  -.097**  -.195**  -.069**  1  
20 Canada .082* .151**  -.058 -.010 .024 -.019 .002 -.027 .153**  -.013 .025 -.008 -.061**  -.047 -.142**  -.083**  -.168**  -.059* -.057* 1 
Min -2.321 -1.878 -2.032 0 1 1 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 2.404 3.143 2.582 55 3 3 4000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean .000 .000 .000 3.17 2.75 2.14 187.19 .167 .058 .090 .176 .223 .284 .04 .29 .12 .37 .07 .06 .05 
Standard deviation 0.998 0.998 0.998 5.432 1.038 .800 254.25 .373 .234 .287 .380 .416 .451 .202 .455 .329 .482 .50 .241 .211 
**  p < .01; * p < .05; n=1,761 
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Table 4. Multinomial logistic regressions predicting comprehensiveness and visibility a 
 
 Firm Strategy b 













Explanatory variables       
Internal stakeholders 5.88 2.53***  1.64***  1.35**  3.05***  2.52***  
Societal stakeholders 9.24**  1.66**  1.36**  1.33**  1.49**  1.36* 
Regulatory stakeholders   .76   .97 1.10**  1.12***  1.07* 1.09**  
Value chain stakeholders   .94 1.31 1.15 1.34**  1.35* 1.39* 
Control variables       
Size   .48 1.00 2.28***  2.08***  3.20***  2.93***  
National Scope  1.15E+24 2.09E+16 7.71E-007***  7.874E-007***  2.92E+26***  2.734E+28***  
International Scope  14.08   .30 1.39   .93   .46   .48 
Among 5-10 competitors 3.27E-006   .21 1.05 1.17   .70   .88 
More than 10 competitors 2.28E-007   .07**    .87   .85   .51   .82 
Food, beverage, textiles 3.534 2.37   .91   .98   .87   .71 
Pulp, paper, print 8.99E-007 2.35   .81   .90 1.08   .61 
Petroleum, chem., rubber 1.17E-005   .56   .76 1.35   .71 1.40 
Machinery, media equip. 9.96E-006 1.25   .59 1.01 1.07 1.87 
Transportation equipment   .00 1.10 2.26**  1.71 2.12 1.60 
Germany 2.55E-005 7.032E-007 6.00 6.33**  6.79E-007***  4.42E-007***  
Hungary 5.45 2.518E-006 7.44* 9.95***  7.26E-007***  3.40E-007***  
Japan 3.31E-005 1.11E-006 5.43 2.20 3.79E-007***  7.97E-008***  
Norway 1.54E-005 1.905E-007 5.24 3.39* 1.66E-007***  6.47E-008***  
France 3.32  11.38**  5.63**  1.03E-005***  2.23E-006***  
Canada 9989.11 6.06 25.68* 10.65**  1.46E-005 2.70E-006 
       
N 1,761  1,761      
-2loglikelihood 870.49***  911.24***      
R2 McFadden   .45   .42     
a  Statistical relationships were estimated using multinomial logistic regression. Reference category is passivists. Exponentiated 
betas are provided. “Local” is the reference market scope dummy. “Less than 5 competitors” is the reference market 
concentration dummy. “Nonmetallic minerals and metals” is the reference sector dummy, and the U.S. is the reference country 
dummy. 
b The baseline models code firms that reported monitori g between 3 to 5 environmental impacts. The stricter models reflect a 
recoding of our monitoring variable such that firms that reported monitoring 4 or 5 environmental impacts were coded as “1”, 
else “0”. 
***  p < .01; **  p < .05; * p < .10 
